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TAX LAW
Partnership Tax Allocations: The Basics
by Walter Schwidetzky
This article discusses the basic rulesforpartnership tax allocations and identifies when practitioners should
consult with experts in this area.
his article endeavors to help practitioners who are not part-
nership tax allocation experts identify when they should
consult with those wi h that expertise. The partnership-allo-
cation Treasury Regulations have been called "a creation of prodi-
gious complexity ... essentially impenetrable to all but those with
the time, talent, and determination to become thoroughly prepared
experts on the subject."1 This article is written for those, to date at
least, without that time and determination. At the same time, the
article provides an introduction to the partnership tax allocation
rules for those contemplating making the requisite investment of
time and determination.
The term "partnership," for purposes of this article, means a tax
partnership.2 A tax partnership typically includes state law partner-
ships and limited liability companies (LLCs) with two or more
members. The term "partner" may also refer to an LLC member.
Regarding tax law generally, there is almost no rule without an
exception. Accordingly, half the sentences in this article could begin
with the words "typically" or "generally"; generally, they don't.
The Partnership Entity
A partnership is a flow-through entity, meaning that the entity
is not taxed. Rather, income and deductions are passed through to
the partners. Thus, a mechanism needs to exist for determining each
partner's allocable share of partnership income and deductions. IRC
§ 704(b) and the Treasury Regulations generally allow partners a
great deal of flexibility in this regard. The allocations do not neces-
sarily have to be proportional to the underlying ownership of the
partnership interests. 4 For example, someone who is otherwise a
50% partner could be allocated 90% of depreciation deductions. Or
all losses could initially be allocated to the "money partners," with
subsequent income allocated to them to the same extent as losses;
subsequently income is allocated 50% to the money partners and
50% to the promoters. (This is sometimes called a "flip"; flips are
quite common.)
As discussed in more detail below, if all of the partners' interests
in the partnership do not change and their shares of recourse and
nonrecourse debt match their partnership interests, a practitioner
can often forgo consulting an expert and inserting complex alloca-
tion language into the partnership agreement. To illustrate, in LLC
ABC, the members'interests are, and always will be, A 40%, B 35%,
and C 25%, and their shares of LLC debt, recourse or nonrecourse,
match those interests.Thus, if the members guarantee an LLC debt
(making the debt recourse to them), they guarantee it in such a way
that their bottom-line liability (assuming everyone is reasonably ex-
pected to fulfill his or her obligation) matches their LLC interests.5
Note that it is preferable if all partners contribute cash. If they con-
tribute appreciated or depreciated property, that does not in and of
itself create a risk of violating the IRC § 704(b) Treasury Regula-
tions, but it does trigger IRC § 704(c) and its Treasury Regulations.
IRC § 704(c) and its Treasury Regulations are complex. An impor-
tant feature is that, generally, tax gain or loss inherent in contributed
property must be allocated to the contributing partner. If the agree-
ment is silent on IRC § 704(c), the partners default into the "tradi-
tional method,"which may not be preferable.6
The overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Treasury
Regulations are meant to address circumstances other than the one
described in the example. The Treasury Regulations endeavor to
permit partners to vary allocations for legitimate business reasons,
while disallowing allocations that primarily have a tax-avoidance
motive. That is a difficult line to draw and makes for complex Treas-
ury Regulations. Many of the IRC's partnership provisions were
created before most of the people reading this article were born, at a
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time when partnerships were usually vehicles for small businesses.
Businesses of any size were typically either C corporations or S
corporations. C corporations are subject to two levels of tax, one on
corporate taxable income and a second on dividends. Tax rates in
the 1960s on C corporations could be over 50%, and top tax rates
on dividends paid to individuals varied from around 90% in 1960
to around 70% in 1970, making double taxation a big problem. An
S corporation has one level of tax, at the shareholder level, but there
is no (or at least no sufficient) means of varying allocations among
shareholders.
7
But taxpayers often wanted flexibility in their business arrange-
ments. Starting in the 1960s, non-publicly traded businesses
increasingly moved to limited partnerships, which afford taxpay-
ers both one level of tax at the partner level and the ability to vary
allocations. Most "tax shelters" from this era were limited partner-
ships. In some ways, Congress and the IRS have been playing
catch-up ever since. Had Congress seen this coming, it might have
constructed the partnership tax rules differently. But it did not.
From time to time, commentators have proposed ways of getting
the genie back into the bottle and radically changing the partner-
ship tax rules to make them less flexible, less subject to abuse, and
often more S corporation-like. But those efforts, to date, have
always come to naught.8 Numerous anti-abuse rules, however, have
been added to the Code and Treasury Regulations, making part-
nership taxation one of the most complex areas in all of taxation
(no mean feat). But the fundamental structure of partnership taxa-
tion has not changed.
*,BERG HILL
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This article takes a "gentle" look at the Treasury Regulations to
provide a basic understanding of the derivation of the complex tax
provisions sometimes seen in partnership agreements. Often these
provisions cannot be avoided, and practitioners need to consult a
tax professional to ensure an agreement says what it needs to say.
But complex tax provisions can sometimes be avoided, as discussed
below.
Substantial Economic Effect Rules
To oversimplify a bit, under IRC § 704(b), allocations must
either be "in accordance with the partner's interest in the partner-
ship" or have "substantial economic effect."9 The Treasury Regula-
tions contain detailed rules on when an allocation has substantial
economic effect, and say little about when an allocation is in accor-
dance with a partner's interest in the partnership. As the name sug-
gests, an allocation has substantial economic effect if it has a gen-
uine after-tax, economic effect on the partner to whom the alloca-
tion is made. Given the detailed provisions in the Treasury
Regulations, the substantial economic effect rules constitute what
tax professionals call a "safe harbor," meaning taxpayers know they
are safe if they comply with these rules. If they do not, they cannot
know with confidence that their allocation regimen will pass
muster (though sometimes they can be confident it will not).
One might assume this reality would force taxpayers to comply
with the safe harbor provisions, and often it does. But in larger
deals it is probably the norm that tax professionals consciously
choose to not comply with the safe harbor, hoping that either the
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IRS or a court can be persuaded that the allocations are in accor-
dance with the partners' interests in the partnership, notwithstand-
ing the lack of a clear definition in this regard. (There are often
good reasons for this choice, which are beyond the scope of this
article.) This choice likely will not have to be defended, however,
because the odds of being audited are low, and there have been a
relatively small number of cases on this issue, some won and some
lost by taxpayers. The more the allocation is primarily about sav-
ing taxes and the less it is driven by genuine business considera-
tions, the more likely it is that the taxpayer will lose.10
Capital Accounts
Given that the Regulations focus on economic effect, a method
is needed to measure a partner's economic investment in the part-
nership. "Capital accounts" perform this function. Partnerships that
wish to formally comply with the substantial economic effect rules
must have a provision in the partnership agreement that requires
the partnership to keep capital accounts in accordance with the
Treasury Regulations. Because the concern here is with economic
rather than tax impacts, the rules for keeping capital accounts are
quite different from the rules for computing partners' tax bases in
their partnership interests.
Under the Treasury Regulations, a partner's capital account is
increased by (1) the amount of money contributed to the partner-
ship; (2) the fair market value of property contributed to the part-
nership (net of liabilities secured by the property); and (3) alloca-
tions of partnership income and gain, including tax-exempt in-
come. A partner's capital account is decreased by (1) the amount
of money distributed to the partner; (2) the fair market value of
property distributed to the partner (net of liabilities secured by the
property); and (3) allocations of expenditures of the partnership
that can neither be capitalized nor deducted in computing taxable
income (usually, this will be zero-an example is a tax penalty for
failing to file a tax return); and (4) allocations of partnership losses
and deductions. 1
Note that a partner's capital account does not include that part-
ner's share of partnership liabilities. But under IRC § 752, the part-
ner's tax basis in his partnership interest can include his share of
those liabilities (a full explanation of which would require a sepa-
rate article). If the partnership has liabilities, a partner's basis in his
partnership interest often will exceed his capital account balance.
Because, subject to the at-risk and passive activity loss rules (ex-
plaining them would require yet another article), a partner may re-
ceive loss allocations up to his basis in the partnership interest
under IRC § 704(d), a partner may have a positive tax basis and a
negative capital account. Partners are allowed to have negative cap-
ital accounts under some circumstances, and defining these circum-
stances makes for a lot of complexity in the Treasury Regulations.
To comply with the Treasury Regulations, a partnership main-
tains "book' accounts for the properties it holds.1 2 For example, if a
partner contributes property with a tax basis of $7,000 and a fair
market value of $10,000, the partnership's tax basis in that prop-
erty under IRC § 723 is $7,000. However, the partnership's "book
value" (sometimes called "book basis" by tax professors) is the full
fair market value of $10,000. Book value, like the capital account,
focuses on the economic value of contributed property. If a part-
nership makes a distribution of property for which the fair market
value differs from its book value, for capital account purposes, the
partnership recognizes the inherent book gain or loss and allocates
that gain or loss to the partners' capital accounts. There probably
will not be any corresponding taxable gain or loss, and thus no
effect on the partners'bases in their partnership interests, as distri-
butions are commonly not taxable events to the partnership or the
partners. 13
For example, assume a partnership has two equal partners, A
and B, and holds a property with a fair market value of $20,000
and a book value of $15,000 (ignore the tax basis and any possible
tax consequences). It distributes the property to A. Recall that As
capital account is reduced for the full fair market value of the prop-
erty, that is, $20,000. To enable capital accounts to properly do their
job, which is to reflect the economics of the partners' investments,
the partners' capital accounts must be adjusted for the gain inherent
in the distributed property. Accordinglyfor capital accountpurposes,
the partnership recognizes the $5,000 of gain inherent in the prop-
erty and allocates $2,500 of the gain to each partner's capital
account, increasing each capital account by that amount.
There are two parts to the substantial economic effect test. First,
the allocation must have economic effect, and second, the eco-
nomic effect must be substantial.
Economic Effect Test
Partnerships have three options under the Treasury Regulations
to satisfy the "economic effect" test: the "regular" economic effect
test, the "alternative" economic effect test (touched on here only
briefly), and the "economic effect equivalence" test (which can spare
"straight-up" deals a lot of complex language in the agreement).
"Regular" Rules
Under the regular test, (1) the partnership must keep capital
accounts in accordance with the rules described above; (2) when
an interest of a partner is liquidated, the partner must be paid any
positive balance in her capital account; and (3) if a partner has a
deficit balance in her capital account, she must pay the deficit to
the partnership by the end of the tax year in which her partnership
interest is liquidated (or, if later, 90 days after liquidation). 14 The
first two parts of the test are self-explanatory. The third rule is
sometimes called a deficit restoration obligation (DRO).
A DRO should rarely be unlimited. For example: Assume the
partners form a limited partnership and all partners have unlim-
ited DROs. An employee of the partnership, while conducting
partnership business, runs over and kills a neurosurgeon with eight
children, all with some type of disability. A large tort liability, in ex-
cess of insurance limits, results.The general partner is the only one
liable under state partnership law, and he contributes sufficient
funds to the partnership to enable it to pay the liability, thus
increasing the general partner's capital account. The payment re-
sults in a large tax loss to the partnership that, depending on the
allocation provisions in the partnership agreement, may be prima-
rily allocated to the limited partners. The allocation causes the lim-
ited partners to have substantial negative capital accounts. If they
have to restore those deficit capital accounts (as might happen if
the general partner decided to take this opportune moment to
cause the partnership to liquidate), they would in effect be paying
the tort liability, which was something that likely was not contem-
plated when they entered into the partnership agreement. The bot-
tomless risk that an unlimited DRO poses makes it untenable for
most partners, even those with management responsibilities. Note
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that unless a DRO provision is carefully drafted, a creditor can be-
come a third-party beneficiary of the DRO and enforce it. Further,
regardless of how well the DRO is drafted, a trustee in bankruptcy
can likely enforce it."5 In response to these realities, the Treasury
Regulations, under some circumstances, permit a partner to have
no DRO or only a limited DRO. Most advisors probably counsel
their clients to avoid DROs altogether, if possible.
To understand the role of DROs, assume the partners have un-
limited DROs. For example: On January 1 of year 1, A and B each
invest $10,000 in the AB partnership. The partnership purchases
equipment for $20,000. The tax basis of the equipment is, of
course, $20,000, and that is also its book value. The Treasury Reg-
ulations in this context focus on the adjustments to book value. 6
Assume that book depreciation deductions are $5,000 per year and
the partnership has no debt.17 Further, assume the partnership
breaks even on its operations except for depreciation deductions,
and thus the partnership operates at a $5,000 book loss per year for
the first three years. The partnership agreement complies with the
regular economic effect rules and allocates all of the depreciation
deductions to A (perfectly permissible). After three years of allo-
cations, As capital account is reduced to a negative ($5,000); B's
capital account remains at $10,000; and the book value of the
equipment is reduced for the depreciation to $5,000. Importantly,
the Treasury Regulations commonly assume that a property has a
fair market value equal to its book value.1 If the partnership were
to liquidate at the end of the third year, the partnership (it is
assumed) could sell the equipment for $5,000. For B to receive the
$10,000 balance in her capital account, A must restore the nega-
tive ($5,000) balance in his capital account. The sale proceeds
coupled with the contribution by A will provide the partnership
with the $10,000 needed to pay B her positive capital account bal-
ance. As As capital account is now zero, the partnership has no
obligation to make a payment to A. In the parlance of the Treasury
Regulations, all of the depreciation allocations have "an economic
effect" on A: As capital account is taken from a positive $10,000
to a negative ($5,000), and A has a DRO. Thus, we have not just
allocated tax attributes to A. The adjustments to As capital account
coupled with the DRO mean that there is a real economic impact
on A as well. Note also that if the partnership is in compliance with
the economic effect rules, after liquidation of a partner's interest,
the partners' capital accounts will be zero.
Alternative Economic Effect Rules
As noted above, the difficulty with the regular economic effect
rules is that partners are required to have unlimited DROs. That
is likely unwise for any owner, but especially for passive investors.
Recognizing this business reality, Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)
(d) provides an alternative. Under this alternative, an allocation
must meet the first two economic effect tests (keep capital accounts
according to the rules and, upon liquidation, pay a partner any pos-
itive balance in his capital account). But instead of having to meet
the third economic effect test by having an unlimited DRO, the
partnership agreement contains a qualified income offset (QIO)
provision (discussed below). Assuming there is no DRO, if this
alternative test is met, an allocation will be treated as having eco-
nomic effect if the allocation does not cause the partner to have a
deficit capital account balance or increase an already-existing deficit
capital account balance. If a partner has a negative capital account
balance, economically she has taken more out of the partnership
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than she put into it (hence the requirement under the regular rules
that she restore any deficit on liquidation of her interest). If the
partner does not have a DRO, it makes sense that a current allo-
cation that would cause her to have a deficit capital account not be
allowed. At one time, that was almost all there was to the rule. The
difficulty with keeping the rule that simple is that a capital account
can become negative for reasons other than allocations. The part-
nership could, for example, make a distribution to a partner that
would cause a deficit capital account balance. While the IRS can
force a partnership to change the way it makes allocations, it can-
not control to whom a partnership makes distributions. 9
The IRS mechanism for eliminating the deficit capital account
of a partner who has no obligation to restore it is the Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) requirement that the partnership allocate
income to the partner to offset any such deficit: This is the QIO. If
a QIO is triggered, the partnership must put aside its normal allo-
cation regimen and allocate income, including gross income, to the
relevant partners, before making any other allocations. If all of the
partners become proportionately negative in their capital accounts,
the QIO may yield the same results as the normal allocation regi-
men. But if some are negative and some not, triggering a QIO can
wreak near-term allocation havoc. Typically, partnership agree-
ments provide that if a QIO is triggered, the partnership will adjust
allocations later to return the partners back to where they would
have been had the QIO not been triggered.
A partner can agree to a limited DRO, which is likely the only
kind of DRO to which a well-advised partner will agree. A part-
ner might agree to a limited DRO to be allocated more losses. In
this circumstance, the partnership must comply with the QJO
rules, and allocations can be made to a partner that create a nega-
tive capital account up to the fixed amount that the partner is obli-
gated to restore. Thus, if a partner has a $10,000 DRO, she could
be given allocations that caused her to have up to a ($10,000) neg-
ative capital account as long as the partnership otherwise complies
with the qualified income offset rules.
As is doubtless obvious, the QIO rules require complex provi-
sions in the partnership agreement. Attorneys should consult
someone with the relevant partnership tax expertise to understand
the implications of each agreement that has QIO provisions.
Most attorneys will not want to comply with the regular rules,
which are already fairly complex and require unlimited DROs.The
QIO rules are even more complex. Is there a way out for the non-
partnership tax specialist? Can an LLC agreement comply with
the Treasury Regulations without having complex tax provisions?
Thankfully, the answer is yes.
Economic Effect Equivalence
Allocations made to a partner that do not otherwise have eco-
nomic effect under the rules discussed above can nevertheless be
deemed to have economic effect under a third alternative, the "eco-
nomic effect equivalence test," also referred to in this article as
"straight-up allocations." If a partnership liquidation at the end of a
given year or at the end of any future year would produce the same
economic results to the partners as would occur if the regular eco-
nomic effect test were met, regardless of the economic perform-
ance of the partnership, the economic equivalence test is met.20
The Treasury Regulations offer this example: Assume A and B
contribute $75,000 and $25,000, respectively, to the AB partner-
ship. Assume further that the partnership maintains no capital
TAX LAW
accounts, the partnership agreement has no "tax provisions," but
the partnership agreement does provide that all income, gain, loss,
deduction, and credit will be allocated 75% to A and 25% to B. A
and B are ultimately liable (under a state law right of contribution)
for 75% and 25%, respectively, of any debts of the partnership.
Although the allocations do not satisfy the requirements of the
regular or alternative economic effect rules discussed above because
of the lack of the relevant provisions in the partnership agreement,
the allocations have economic effect under the economic effect
equivalence test.21 Further, most partnership tax practitioners
would say the allocation is also in accordance with the "partners'
interest in the partnership" (the "backstop" IRC § 704(b)) test.
Thus, in a sense this allocation regimen is doubly safe. It would be
wise to state in the operating agreement that "the relevant percent-
ages are the partners'interest in the partnership," to take full advan-
tage of the statute.
In more complex situations, such as when the partners have
varying interests over time or varying interests in different items,
it may be difficult or even impossible to prove that a liquidation of
the partnership at the end of a given year or at the end of any future
year would produce the same economic results to the partners as
would occur if the regular economic effect test were met, regard-
less of the economic performance of the partnership. Accordingly,
practitioners can only be confident that they will be in compliance
with the economic effect equivalent test (which typically means
also being in compliance with the partners' interests in the partner-
ship test) if the partners' interests in all tax items are always the
same and their liability for partnership debts matches their part-
nership interests (as in the example from the Treasury Regula-
tions).
Straying from these limitations without partnership tax exper-
tise invites peril, but there may be a little wiggle room for liabili-
ties. As just noted, for attorneys who want to avoid complex tax
provisions, it is generally recommended that the sharing of liabili-
ties match allocations and the partners'partnership interests. Recall
that a partner's share of partnership liabilities gives the partner
more basis in the partnership interest, and more basis can lead to
more deductions.That said, if everything else is held constant, and
one partner has a proportionately larger share of labilities than
other partners, it may simply mean that he runs out of basis later
and can take a greater share of his deductions currently.
For example, assume that in the equal AB LLC, each of the two
members contributed $100 to the LLC and owns a 50% interest.
They agree to split everything 50/50. The LLC has $200 of debt,
which A has personally guaranteed, without a right of contribution
from B. Under IRC § 752, the debt is classified as recourse debt and
is allocated entirely to A. Under these facts, As basis in his LLC
interest is $300 and B's is $100.22 Putting aside the at-risk and pas-
sive activity loss rules, if the LLC operates at a loss, A may be able to
use his 50% share of losses more quickly than B, given As higher
basis. Assume, for example, that the LLC has a net loss in the first
year of $400, $200 of which is preliminarily allocated to each mem-
ber. A can deduct his entire $200 share, but B can deduct only $100,
because under IRC § 704(d), a member's loss deductions are lim-
ited to the member's basis in the partnership interest (for an LLC
classified as a partnership). For B, the other $100 of loss is carried
forward to a future year when B has more basis in the LLC interest.
In this simple example, it might well be possible for the partners to
meet the economic effect equivalence test, notwithstanding the fact
of fceevouti on
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that they do not share partnership debt in the same proportions as
their general ownership interests. But the rules for sharing liabili-
ties, recourse and nonrecourse, get very complicated, very quickly.
And those rules interact with the economic effect rules. So while
there may be situations where partners can share liabilities dispro-
portionately and still meet the economic effect equivalence test, it
would be wiser, nonetheless, to consult with a partnership tax pro-
fessional in these circumstances.
Substantiality
Note that the entire name of the regulatory safe harbor is the
substantial economic effect test. For all of their complexity, the eco-
nomic effect rules are not enough to get the job done. They are, for
the most part, mechanical rules, and like all mechanical rules can
be inappropriately manipulated. Accordingly, the Treasury Regu-
lations provide that the allocation must have economic effect and
that the economic effect must be substantial. The Treasury Regu-
lations provide four independent tests of whether the economic
effect of an allocation is substantial, the details of which are,
frankly, too much detail.
The underlying concern is that the allocation system might be
used to change tax consequences without bottom-line economic
consequences. It is almost impossible to trigger a substantiality
issue if straight-up allocations are made. But to impart a feel for
the area, the baseline rule (as I like to tell my students) is that the
economic effect of an allocation is not substantial if, on a present-
value, after-tax basis, there is a strong likelihood that someone is
better off and no one is worse off than would be the case if the allo-
cation were not present.23 Under these circumstances, it means that
the allocation had a tax effect, but no economic effect (on a present
value basis). For there to be substantial economic effect, if some-
one is better off, someone else has to be worse off.
A commonly used example of an allocation that does not have
substantial economic effect involves a "net operating loss." Over-
simplified, a net operating loss or "NOL" is a net loss from busi-
ness operations. Under IRC § 172, an NOL may be carried back 2
years and forward 20 years. Thus, for example, a taxpayer may off-
set an NOL in one year against income in a subsequent year.
Assume now that AB partnership has two equal partners, A and
B. The partnership also has reliable, fairly constant net income
from year to year. Partner A has substantial NOLs unrelated to the
partnership that would otherwise expire unused. To allow A to
fully use her NOLs, the partnership allocates all of the net part-
nership income to A in year 1, all of the net partnership income to
B in year 2, and thereafter returns to a 50/50 allocation. Note that
how the partnership distributes money does not have to track how
it allocates income. When the two years are viewed together, both
A and B are better off than if the usual 50/50 allocations had been
made for both years. A got to take more advantage of her NOL
and B got to avoid tax on income for year 1. If there is a strong
likelihood of this outcome, the economic effect of the allocation is
not substantial, and under the Treasury Regulations the IRS will
require the partnership to make a 50/50 allocation of the net part-
nership income in years 1 and 2.24
Allocations of Nonrecourse Deductions
Allocating nonrecourse deductions becomes remarkably com-
plex, even by partnership tax standards. LLCs add another layer of
complexity: It is possible in the LLC context to have debt that
counts as recourse debt under one Code section and nonrecourse
debt under another Code section!2 Without delving into too much
detail, the basic problem as well as the basics of the solution can be
illustrated by a non-partnership example. Assume a taxpayer buys
depreciable property for $1,000, paying $200 in cash and borrowing
the balance of $800 on a nonrecourse basis with the property secur-
ing the nonrecourse loan. The first $200 of depreciation will come
out of the equity in the property (the $200 paid for with cash).The
allocation of that depreciation falls within the substantial economic
effect rules. The other $800 of depreciation, the portion that is
attributable to the nonrecourse debt, does not. The reason is that its
allocation cannot truly be said to have economic effect, because the
creditor, not the taxpayer, is the one truly taking the risk.
In regulatory parlance, deductions attributable to nonrecourse
debt are called nonrecourse deductions. Simply disallowing all
nonrecourse deductions is not a viable option, so the IRS created
a parallel allocation regime. A cornerstone of that regime is based
on Commissioner v. Tufts,26 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the minimum amount realized upon the disposition of prop-
erty subject to nonrecourse debt is the amount of that debt. Thus,
using the above example, assume the taxpayer depreciated the tax
basis of the property down to zero but makes no principal pay-
ments on the debt. If the creditor later forecloses on the property,
the taxpayer's amount realized is (ignoring foreclosure costs) $800;
his basis is zero, resulting in $800 of recognized gain.That $800 of
gain, then, is the "minimum gain" that the taxpayer can recognize.
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Minimum gain is the foundation on which the Treasury Regula-
tions for allocating partnership nonrecourse deductions rest.27 The
good news is that by using straight-up allocations, these Treasury
Regulations normally will not pose a problem.
2
Conclusion
Because LLCs are the favored entity in the United States, and
LLCs with two or more members typically are taxed as partner-
ships, partnership taxation far and away is the most important area
of tax for closely held, domestic businesses.
In a double-spaced Word document, it took about 110 pages to
cover in detail the topics discussed in this article. 29 Obviously, this
is very complicated material, and this article simply highlights basic
issues. But lawyers without expertise in partnership taxation who
form LLCs need to have a feel for the core issues, if for no other
reason than to avoid wandering inadvertently into a partnership
taxation black hole.
Thanks to Adam M. Cohen for his assistance with this
article and also to Thomas E. Rutledge not only for his help
with this article, but with many otherprojects over the years.
Notes
1. Lokken,"Partnership Allocations," 41 Tax L.Rev. 547 (1986).
2. This article borrows heavily from Lipton et al., Partnership Taxa-
tion, Chapter 5 (4th ed. Carolina Academic Press 2017). I am the primary
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